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In November, South Korea joined the ranks of countries striving to limit the upwards pressure on their 
currency when two lawmakers submitted a parliamentary proposal to impose various taxes on foreign 
capital inflows and outflows. If any of these measures pushes through, South Korea would become the 
first (traditionally financially liberalised) OECD country to reinstate capital controls. This brings the list of 
countries intervening directly, indirectly or considering intervention to more than 23. This is unwelcome 
disturbing,  but hardly surprising development: as  policy rates  in the US  are at near-zero levels  and 
monetary  policy  is  geared  towards  managing  the  yield  curve  in  order  to  meet  domestic  objectives, 
emerging  countries  throughout  the  world  are  scrambling  to  protect  themselves  from  the  negative 
spillovers in the form of massive capital inflows. 
 
Unfortunately, the apparent legitimacy of these concerns ignores one fundamental element, namely the 
asymmetric  nature  of  the  shock  that  has  hit  the  global  economy:  as  private  deleveraging  remains 
incomplete, while public deleveraging has barely started, demand in industrialised countries is set to 
remain subdued in the years to come, while in the developing and emerging economies it remains on a 
strong growth track. Already output in most emerging countries is back to a level consistent with pre-
crisis trends, whereas it remains significantly below in advanced countries. This fundamental asymmetry 
will need to be compensated for by some form of adjustment in relative prices: in order to compensate 
for the slack, industrialised countries will have to go through either a substantial depreciation of their 
currencies or a protracted period of deflation in order to reinstate relative competitiveness. 
 
This  adjustment  in  exchange  rates  is  being  resisted  for  understandable  economic  reasons.  For  an 
emerging country, the relevant policy variable is not just the bilateral exchange rate between itself and 
its trading partners in the advanced world, but a vector of exchange rates that also includes those of its 
competitors in the emerging and developing world. Individually, it thus makes sense for a country to lean 
against appreciation if it expects its trading partners and competitors to do the same. This highlights one 
of  the  coordination  problems  in  today’s  currency  jousting:  appreciation  of  the  emerging  countries’ 
currencies might be desirable on an aggregate basis, but it requires all of these currencies to appreciate 
simultaneously.  
                                                            
1 This version updates and corrects a previous version, in which we reported that the index of emerging currencies 
was still below 2007 levels. This was due to an error in the weighting of countries. In fact, the index has recovered 
its losses. This does not, however, substantially change our views on the issue. © Bruegel 2010  http://www.bruegel.org  2 
 
Getting a clear picture of the extent of this appreciation is in fact 
complex, owing to the fact that appreciating vis-a-vis the dollar – by 
far  the  most  commonly  cited  yardstick  of  a  country’s  currency 
stance  –  does  not  signify  an  across-the-board  appreciation  with 
respect to the advanced countries’ group.  
 
It  is,  however,  possibly  to  construct  a  simple  summary  indicator 
that  helps  monitor  the  evolution  of  exchange  rates  between 
advanced  and  emerging  economies.  It  is  common  to  compute 
trade-weighted  real  effective  exchange  rates  for  individual 
countries  with  respect  to  groups  of  other  countries.  A  simple 
extension is to compute an effective exchange rate between two 
groups of countries (Box 1).  
 
We  construct  the  index  between  two  blocs  of  countries, 
« advanced » and « emerging ». The sample is not comprehensive 
but it contains all major countries: it is comprised of the top 20 
countries in terms of total trade (excluding euro-area countries), 
plus  the  euro  area.    In  order  to  ensure  a  minimal  degree  of 
homogeneity with respect to the shock of the financial crisis, the 
group  of  industrialised  countries  includes  only  western  countries 
plus Japan (countries such as Singapore, or South Korea, thus fall 






Source : IMF International Trade Statistics, IMF International Financial Statistics, 
Datastream, National Sources, authors’ calculations. 
              
Figure 1 gives the nominal effective exchange rate of the emerging-
countries  group  vis-à-vis  the  advanced-countries  group.  Between 
July 2007 and September 2008 this index did not change much. 
                                                            
2 Advanced countries (Australia, Canada, Euro Area, Japan, Switzerland, Sweden, United States, United Kingdom) 
and Emerging countries (Brazil, China, Hong Kong, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Thailand, United Arab Emirates). Whilst an important trading partner, Taiwan was excluded from the index for lack 



























































































































































            
   
 
        
    
    
      
   
 
        
    
        
       
Box 1.1 Methodology 
The  two  indicators  computed 
here  are  simply  equal  to  the 
weighted  average,  for  each  of 
the  two  blocs,  of  the  individual 
REER  of  each  country  vis-à-vis 
the opposite bloc. Trade-weights 
are used both for computing the 
country REER and for averaging 
across  countries  of  the  same 
bloc.  The  methodology  is 
identical to that used in Pisani-
Ferry and Cohen-Setton (2008).  
Formally,  let  I,J,K  be  three 
different regions. If Xi,j is country 
i’s trade with partner j in region 
J, then 
is the total trade of i with region J.  
Let  ei,j  be  the  bilateral  exchange 
rate  between  i  and  j.  Country  i’s 
bilateral (real) exchange rate with 
country J is  
Thus  the  effective  exchange  rate 
between region I and region J is  
Simple weights (own calculations) 
are used, based on total bilateral 
trade flows in 2007. The sample is 
restricted to the top 20 countries 
in terms of world trade, plus the 
euro area. The CPI is used as the 
price index. 
 
Figure 1: Effective exchange rate of emerging countries 
vis-à-vis advanced countries © Bruegel 2010  http://www.bruegel.org  3 
In  the  wake  of  the  Lehman  collapse  it  registered  a  sharp  drop,  consistent  with  the  flight-to-quality 
episode that occurred in the turmoil of the financial crisis. This index remained stable throughout 2009, 
before appreciating at the beginning of 2010.  
 
This result is in part unsurprising. In end-2008 most emerging market currencies depreciated largely as 
capital flew out in search of safer investments to store value. What is more striking, given the arguments 
presented  above,  is  that  despite  an  asymmetric  shock  of  exceptional  magnitude,  emerging  market 
currencies have not appreciated significantly against advanced economies and again seem to be heading 
downwards, something that is not immediately obviously if one looks solely at the bilateral USD rates 
(Figure 2). Looking individually at the countries that compose the index, it can be seen that some kind of 
dollar effect is at work : countries tightly pegged to the dollar, such as China, Hong Kong, the United Arab 
Emirates or Malaysia registered a decline vis-à-vis the advanced countries’ group, whilst others have 
appreciated.  Taking into account changes in the relative real value of currencies within the advanced 





Source : Datastream, WM Reuters, Bruegel calculations 
Note : in figure 3, the index value of Korea (dashed line) is read on the right axis for presentation purposes. In both graphs, 
countries are also selected solely to clarify presentation. 
 
 The above observations highlight the collective action dimension of the exchange-rate policy tensions 
the world is experiencing. Despite some form of appreciation since the lows of 2009, the currencies of 
emerging markets are on average not strong and are moreover subject to considerable volatility. Given 
the deeply asymmetric nature of the shock to advanced and emerging economies, a return of their 
effective exchange rate to the 2007 level is not likely to be sufficient, given the magnitude of the global 
rebalancing  act  that  eventually  needs  to  take  place.  There  is  therefore  still  considerable  scope  for 
appreciation.  But no country will want to let its currency appreciate as long as other partners do not 
follow suit.   
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Figure 3 : Selected effective real exchange rates of emerging 
economies vis-a-vis advanced (July 2007 = 100)* 
Figure 2 : Selected nominal USD exchange rates of emerging 
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SAUDI ARABIA  THAILAND
KOREA (RIGHT AXIS)